State of New York Public Employment Relations Board Decisions from January 24, 1989 by New York State Public Employment Relations Board
Cornell University ILR School 
DigitalCommons@ILR 
Board Decisions - NYS PERB New York State Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) 
1-24-1989 
State of New York Public Employment Relations Board Decisions 
from January 24, 1989 
New York State Public Employment Relations Board 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/perbdecisions 
Thank you for downloading an article from DigitalCommons@ILR. 
Support this valuable resource today! 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the New York State Public Employment Relations Board 
(PERB) at DigitalCommons@ILR. It has been accepted for inclusion in Board Decisions - NYS PERB by an 
authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@ILR. For more information, please contact catherwood-
dig@cornell.edu. 
If you have a disability and are having trouble accessing information on this website or need materials in an 
alternate format, contact web-accessibility@cornell.edu for assistance. 
State of New York Public Employment Relations Board Decisions from January 
24, 1989 
Keywords 
NY, NYS, New York State, PERB, Public Employment Relations Board, board decisions, labor disputes, 
labor relations 
Comments 
This document is part of a digital collection provided by the Martin P. Catherwood Library, ILR School, 
Cornell University. The information provided is for noncommercial educational use only. 
This article is available at DigitalCommons@ILR: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/perbdecisions/338 
#2A-l/24/89 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED UNIVERSITY PROFESSIONS, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-IQ321 
STATE OF NEW YORK (GOVERNOR'S OFFICE 
OF EMPLOYEE RELATIONS), 
Respondent. 
RUBY P. LOCKHART, for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the United 
University Professions (UUP) to the dismissal, as untimely, 
of its improper practice charge against the State of New York 
(Governor's Office of Employee Relations) (State). The 
charge alleges that a bargaining unit employee, Dr. K. Duffy, 
was discriminated against with respect to promotion and 
discretionary salary increases because of her union activity, 
in violation of §§209-a.1(a), (b) and (c) of the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act). Upon the ground that^ 
the charge was filed more than four months after the denial 
of promotion and discretionary salary increases, the Director 
of Public Employment Practices and Representation dismissed 
Board - U-10321 
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the charge as having been untimely filed-i/ under §204.1(a) (1) 
of PERB's Rules of Procedure. 
2/ 
UUP asserts that it filed, on Dr. Duffy's behalf, a sex 
discrimination complaint in January 1988, in connection with 
r 
the same claims of denial of promotion and discretionary 
salary increases as alleged in the instant charge. In an 
April 1988 letter of determination, a committee designated to 
investigate and review the sex discrimination complaint found 
no evidence of sex discrimination, although it did make a 
finding of disparate treatment of Dr. Duffy in relation to 
similarly situated colleagues. UUP asserts that this 
determination constitutes the point from which our limitation 
period should run, because it was upon issuance of this 
determination that Dr. Duffy became aware that her union 
activity^/ was the motivation for her disparate treatment. 
We agree with the Director that the actions complained of in 
•i/uUP alleges that, prior to and during 1987, Dr. Duffy 
was denied promotion to full professor and was denied 
discretionary salary increases granted to bargaining unit 
members in the fall of each year from 1984 to 1987. The 
instant charge was filed on August 17, 1988. 
•^Section 204.1(a)(1) of the Rules requires that an 
improper practice charge be filed within four months of the 
alleged improper practice. 
•2^ The Committee's determination (annexed to the charge) 
ascribes no motive to the disparate treatment found, and 
makes no mention of Dr. Duffy's union activity. However, UUP 
alleges that the Committee, subsequent to issuance of its 
determination, stated to Dr. Duffy its belief that "it was 
Dr. Duffy's union activities which caused the 
discrimination." 
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the charge (i.e., the denial of promotion and discretionary 
salary increases) were known by Dr. Duffy and her 
representative to have occurred prior to and during 1987, and 
that our Rules require that a charge be filed within four 
months- after sucliadvei^ action took place. The limitation 
period contained in our Rules runs from the date the adverse 
action took place or could reasonably have been discovered, 
and not from the date when improper motivation is ascribed to 
it.^-/ The Director accordingly properly dismissed the charge 
as having been untimely filed. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the charge be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed in its entirety. 
DATED: January 24, 1989 
Albany, New York 
^X-g^g— r^- A/GL^<S-UJL. 
/Harold R. Newman,Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, MemberV^ 
Vsee Board of Education of the CSD of the City of New 
York (Chamber 1 in) , 15 PERB ?[3050 (1982) . 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
ERIE COUNTY WATER AUTHORITY UNIT, LOCAL 
#815 CSEA, INC., LOCAL 1000, 
AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-9991 
ERIE COUNTY WATER AUTHORITY, 
Respondent. 
JOSEPH E. O'DONNELL, ESQ., for Charging Party 
JOHN P. NOBLE, ESQ., for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the Erie 
County Water Authority Unit, Local #815 CSEA, Inc., Local 
1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA) to the dismissal of its improper 
practice charge against the Erie County Water Authority 
(Authority). That charge alleges that the Authority violated 
§2 09-a.l(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act 
(Act) when, on October 29, 1987, the Authority unilaterally 
established an overtime work rule which limited the number of 
overtime hours permitted to be worked by unit employees to 15 
hours within a 24-hour period, except in an emergency or 
except as necessary to complete a single overtime assignment. 
CSEA alleges that this overtime work rule violates past 
practices of the parties, and constitutes a unilateral change 
in terms and conditions of employment. 
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According to the stipulated record before the assigned 
Administrative Law Judge (AKT), CSEA had filed numerous 
contract grievances protesting various applications of the 
overtime work rule, asserting that the implementation of the 
work rule violated A ^ 
collective bargaining agreement, but these grievances were 
subsequently withdrawn by CSEA. Finding that CSEA's 
withdrawal of its contract grievances rendered moot the 
question of whether PERB should defer the matter, or, at the 
outset, decide whether it has subject matter jurisdiction, 
pursuant to our decision in Herkimer County BOCES, 2 0 PERB 
J[3050 (1987) , the ALJ turned to the question of whether PERB 
) has jurisdiction over the issue raised by the improper 
practice charge. 
The ALJ found that while the parties1 collective 
bargaining agreement covers the issue of assignment and 
distribution of overtime and dismissed the charge pursuant to 
§205.5(d) of the Act,i/ deferral to arbitration would be 
inappropriate under the circumstances of this case. Our 
decision in Herkimer County BOCES, supra, contemplates 
i/section 205.5(d) of the Act provides: "[T]he board 
shall not have authority to enforce an agreement between an 
employer and an employee organization and shall not exercise 
jurisdiction over an alleged violation of such an agreement 
that would not otherwise constitute an improper employer or 
employee organization practice." 
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deferral in those situations in which the charging party has 
grieved as well as filed an improper practice charge on the 
same matter. We concur in this determination by the ALJ, 
inasmuch as CSEA has withdrawn its grievances in connection 
With this issue, therALJ appropriateTy addressed the issue of 
PERB's jurisdiction without deferral. 
We also affirm the ALT's determination that the language 
of the parties' collective bargaining agreement evidences 
negotiation of the subject of overtime authorization and 
distribution. That agreement provides: "Overtime work shall 
be performed only in cases of emergency and when authorized 
by an employee's immediate supervisor or department head", 
) and "When overtime is required and authorized, the Authority 
shall endeavor to equitably distribute such overtime work 
among qualified employees within the job classification in 
which the overtime is worked." 
Because the parties' agreement covers the issue of 
overtime and its distribution, it is manifest that 
negotiations have taken place between the parties on the 
subject. Accordingly, the ALJ correctly found that CSEA's 
complaint is a question of contract interpretation only and 
that it has failed to meet its burden of establishing a 
unilateral change in terms and conditions of employment. 
2 / 
•2 /see S t . Lawrence County , 10 PERB H[3058 (1977) . 
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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the charge be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed in its entirety. 
DATED: January 24, 1989 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eis enb erg, Meml^er 
#2(3-1/24/89 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
THOMAS C. BARRY, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-977 9 
UNITED UNIVERSITY PROFESSIONS, 
Respondent. 
THOMAS C. BARRY, pro se 
BERNARD F. ASHE, ESQ. (IVOR R. MOSKOWITZ, ESQ., of 
Counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of United 
University Professions (UUP) and the cross-exceptions of 
Thomas C. Barry (Barry) to an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) 
decision which upheld in part, and dismissed in part, an 
improper practice charge filed by Barry which alleges that 
the agency shop fee procedure adopted by UUP for its 1987-88 
fiscal year violates §209-a.2(a) of the Public Employees' 
Fair Employment Act (Act)i/ in six aspects. 
i/section 208.3(a) of the Act requires that an employee 
organization receiving agency fees from bargaining unit 
members who do not join the employee organization develop and 
maintain "a procedure providing for the refund to any 
employee demanding the return [of] any part of an agency shop 
fee deduction which represents the employee's pro rata share 
of expenditures by the organization in aid of activities or 
causes of a political or ideological nature only incidentally 
related to terms and conditions of employment." 
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The six aspects of the procedure alleged by Barry to 
violate the Act are the following: 
1. The 15-day period in June for the filing 
of the initial objection to agency fees 
for the upcoming fiscal year is 
unreasonably short and occurs at a time 
when school is not in session. 
2. The procedure does not provide for the 
furnishing of financial information prior 
to the filing of objections by agency fee 
payers. 
3. The requirement that objectors notify UUP 
by certified or registered mail of their 
objection and at each step of the 
appellate procedure is coercive. 
4. The advance reduction determination is 
not based upon an outside audit of those 
expenditures which are deemed refundable 
and those which are not. 
5. There is no provision for placing the 
amount of fees reasonably in dispute in 
an interest-bearing escrow account 
pending the neutral's determination. 
6. Hearing as to the correctness of the 
advance reduction is not held within a 
reasonable time period. 
The ALJ dismissed as untimely Claim No. 1, Claim No. 2 
and so much of Claim No. 3 as alleges that UUP's agency fee 
refund procedure requires that submission of initial 
objections to the use of agency fee monies for purposes not 
permitted by the Act be filed by certified or registered 
mail. To the extent that Claim No. 3 alleges that UUP's 
procedure contains a certified mail requirement for other 
communications falling within four months of the filing of 
the charge, the ALJ determined that this aspect of the charge 
was timely filed. 
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It is our determination that the ALJ correctly applied 
the principles contained in our recent decision in Middle 
Country Teachers Association (Werner), 21 PERB f3012 (1988) , 
and §204.1(a)(1) of PERB's Rules of Procedure (Rules), which 
requires that improper practice charges be filed within four 
months of the act or omission complained of. The dismissal 
of Claim No. 1, Claim No. 2 and the portion of Claim No. 3 
relating to the filing of initial objections is affirmed on 
the grounds set forth in the ALJ decision, which will not be 
repeated here. Accordingly, those aspects of the charge are 
dismissed. 
We further affirm the ALJ's determination that, as to 
the portion of Claim No. 3 which is timely, UUP's requirement 
that filings pursuant to its procedure be made by certified 
or registered mail violates §209-a.2(a) of the Act, in 
accordance with our findings in UUP (Barry, Eson, Gallup), 
20 PERB ^3039 (1987). We there found the certified mail 
requirement to be unduly burdensome upon objecting agency fee 
payers, in terms of relative cost and the availability of 
other reasonably reliable methods of filing.'2-/ We also note 
the absence of any reciprocal use of this type of service on 
the part of the employee organization in fulfilling its 
obligations under the procedure. 
With respect to Claim No. 4, the ALT made two specific 
findings of violation of §209-a.2(a) of the Act. First, she 
^/20 PERB ^3039, at 3077. 
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found that UUP failed to present any evidence that it had 
conducted any "outside audit" at all of its chargeable and 
nonchargeable expenses. We agree with the ALJ that UUP had 
the burden of establishing the conduct of an audit of its 
chargeable and nonchargeable expenditures and that it failed 
to meet that burden. Inasmuch as such an audit is required 
by our previous decision, we affirm the ALJ's finding that 
UUP violated §209-a(2)(a) of the Act when it failed to 
conduct an audit and failed to provide Barry with its results 
as part of the information needed by him to determine whether 
to challenge UUP's advance reduction determination. 
3/ 
Second, she found that the audits conducted of UUP's 
affiliate organizations, NYSUT and AFT, do not meet the 
"outside audit" requirement imposed by this Board, because 
they are not "independent", as required by our decision in 
UUP (Barry, Eson, Gallup), supra. The ALJ based this 
determination upon language contained in the written audit 
report procedures submitted by the auditors which state as 
follows: 
•S/uUP argues in its brief that our decision in UUP (Eson, 
Barry, Gallup), supra, issued on July 8, 1987, allowed it to 
continue its 1987-88 agency fee refund procedure until a new 
procedure was presented by UUP and approved by this Board, 
and that its failure to conduct an outside audit of 
chargeable and nonchargeable expenses was thereby protected. 
Our decision does not, nor was it intended to, allow for such 
a result. The authorization given by this Board to UUP to 
proceed with its agency fee refund procedure, rather than 
direct a discontinuance of collection of agency fees, did not 
constitute an imprimatur of approval on UUP's 1987-88 
procedure implemented prior to our final decision, nor did it 
constitute a bar to the filing of charges challenging the 
procedure. 
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We have applied certain agreed-upon procedures to 
the schedule with respect to the allocation of 
expenses as between amounts chargeable and 
nonchargeable to agency fee payers for the year 
ended August 31, 1986. Our procedures included the 
following: 
(a) We reviewed the underlying assumptions for 
reasonableness. 
(b) We tested the allocation for mathematical 
accuracy. 
Because the foregoing procedures do not constitute 
an examination made in accordance with generally 
accepted auditing standards, we do not express an 
opinion on any such allocations. However, nothing 
came to our attention that caused us to believe 
that the allocations should be adjusted. Had we 
performed additional procedures, matters might have 
come to our attention that would have been reported 
to you. (Emphases supplied.) 
The ALT found that these audits were not sufficiently 
"independent", as required by this Board in earlier 
decisions, because some unspecified procedures were "agreed 
upon" between them and their auditing firms, implying a lack 
of independence and customary discretion on the part of the 
accounting firm. 
The ALT also found that the obligation imposed by this 
Board to conduct an outside audit of refundable and 
nonrefundable expenditures must be construed as requiring 
that the audit be conducted in the usual and customary 
fashion for the conduct of audits. She accordingly held that 
the statement contained in the audit reports submitted to 
NYSUT and AFT by their auditing firms that the audits were 
not conducted "in accordance with generally accepted auditing 
standards" requires the conclusion that the audits do not 
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meet minimum standards and are thus violative of §209-a.2(a) 
of the Act. 
The record establishes that NYSUT's audit was conducted 
by the accounting firm of Buchbinder, Stein, Tunick & 
Platkin, CPAs, and that the AFT's audit was conducted by KMG 
Main Hurdman, CPAs. On their face, then, it appears that the 
audit reports were conducted by "independent" certified 
auditors. We also note that the determination as to whether 
expenses of an employee organization are chargeable or not 
chargeable to agency fee payers calls for legal conclusions, 
and not auditing conclusions. 
4/ 
The determination as to 
whether expenses are chargeable or nonchargeable to an agency 
4/see Hohe v. Casey, 695 F. Supp. 814, USDC, MDPa 
(September 15, 1988), wherein the court quoted the decision 
of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Andrews v. 
Education Ass'n of Cheshire, 829 F. 2d 335, at 340, as 
follows: 
Appellants' claim that Hudson requires that both 
the union's expenditures and its allocation of 
expenses to chargeable and nonchargeable categories 
be audited turns on an interpretation of the 
purpose of an audit. Appellants' approach to this 
problem would have the auditor making a legal, not 
an accounting, decision regarding the 
appropriateness of the allocation of expenses to 
the chargeable and nonchargeable categories. We 
believe, however, that Hudson's auditing 
requirement is only designed to insure that the 
usual function of an auditor is fulfilled. That 
usual function is to insure that the expenditures 
which the union claims it made for certain expenses 
were actually made for those expenses. The union's 
plan satisfies this requirement. The appellants' 
interpretation of Hudson's auditing requirement is 
overly broad because it seeks to have the auditor 
function both as an auditor in the traditional 
sense and as the independent decision maker as to 
chargeable expenses. 
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fee payer is one for the neutral decision maker, also 
required by Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 
109 S. Ct. 1066, 19 PERB 1[7502 (1986) and our decision in UUP 
(Barry, Eson, Gallup), supra. 
However, even accepting these limitations upon the scope 
of an independent auditor's report with respect to chargeable 
and nonchargeable expenses, a question of fact is created by 
the language contained in the audit reports which requires 
further information before any determination can be made as 
to whether the reports meet the minimum standards set forth 
in Hudson, supra, and our decision in UUP (Barry, Eson. 
Gallup), supra. We accordingly reverse so much of the ALJ 
decision as finds that UUP's affiliate organizations' audit 
reports are inadequate as a matter of law, based upon the 
language contained in the audit reports, and remand the 
matter for further proceedings to determine the independence 
and scope of the audit reports and the extent to which 
departure from generally accepted auditing standards occurred 
and may have affected Barry's entitlement to an independent 
audit. 
As to Claim No. 5, which alleges a violation of the Act 
by virtue of UUP's failure to place the amount of fees 
reasonably in dispute in an interest-bearing escrow account 
pending a neutral's determination, we affirm the finding of 
the ALJ that this aspect of the charge should be dismissed 
upon the basis that, in light of the provision of a 
"10 percent cushion" in the advance reduction payment made by 
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UUP, an interest-bearing escrow account is not required by 
the Act.^/ This aspect of the charge is accordingly-
dismissed. 
Finally, we reach the question of whether UUP scheduled 
and conducted a hearing as to the correctness of its advance 
reduction determination within a reasonable period of time, 
as required by Hudson, supra, and UUP (Barry, Eson, Gallup), 
supra. In reliance upon our decision in UUP (Barry, Eson, 
Gallup), supra, the ALT concluded that the hearing on the 
appropriateness of the advance reduction determination made 
by UUP was not held within a reasonable period of time. 
The record establishes that Barry's initial objection to 
the use of his 1987-88 agency shop fees for purposes not 
required by the Act was filed on June 26, 1987. He received 
an advance reduction payment on August 25, 1987, and a 
second, 10 percent cushion payment on September 23, 1987. 
UUP began to collect agency fee payments following the start 
of its fiscal year on September 1, 1987. Barry timely 
appealed the amount of the advance reduction on October 1, 
1987. By letter dated November 2, Barry was notified of the 
date of the hearing on his appeal, which was scheduled to be 
held on December 14, 1987. 
Thus, UUP issued notification, less than four weeks 
following expiration of the objection period, of the 
availability of a hearing date to persons who had filed 
-5/see UUP (Barry, Eson, Gallup) , supra, at 3114. 
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objections. The hearing was actually conducted less than six 
weeks following notification of the hearing date. As pointed 
out by UUP in its brief, the hearing date must be scheduled 
sufficiently far in advance to enable objecting agency fee 
payers to prepare for and schedule their appearance at the 
hearing. Under these circumstances, it does not appear that 
a lapse of 2 1/2 months from the filing by Barry of his 
objection to the agency fee advance reduction determination 
made by UUP to the date of the hearing is excessive or 
unreasonable. This is particularly so in light of the fact 
that hearings may not appropriately be scheduled until all 
objections have been filed and reviewed to determine the 
appropriateness of geographical location(s) of the hearing, 
the number of objectors wishing to participate in the 
hearing, and in light of the process necessary to obtain the 
name of an arbitrator from the American Arbitration 
Association (the independent organization utilized by UUP to 
arrange for a neutral decision maker to hear the advance 
reduction determination case) and to schedule the hearing 
with the arbitrator designated. 
Our holding in this case is not inconsistent with our 
decision in UUP (Barryf Eson, Gallup), supra. In that case 
we affirmed the ALJ's finding that UUP failed, to schedule a 
hearing on its 1986-87 reduction determination within a 
reasonable time. In that case, however, we based our finding 
solely upon a lack of evidence that such a hearing had ever 
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been scheduled or held.-6-/ We did not adopt the ALJ's dictum 
that if an advance reduction determination hearing had been 
scheduled for December 1, 1986, it would not have been 
reasonably prompt. 
Based upon the foregoing, the ALJ determination in the 
instant case that UUP failed to conduct its advance reduction 
determination hearing within a reasonable time period is 
reversed, and this aspect of the charge is dismissed. 
IT IS, ACCORDINGLY, ORDERED that: 
1. This matter is remanded to the ALJ for a 
determination concerning the appropriateness of the 
audits conducted by the accounting firms retained 
by UUP affiliate organizations of those 
expenditures which are deemed refundable and those 
which are not; 
2. UUP forthwith refund to Barry the amount of agency 
fees deducted from his salary payable to UUP, and 
not forwarded to its affiliates, for the 1987-88 
fiscal year, with interest at the maximum legal 
rate, and; 
6/The 
evidence in that case established that a hearing was 
scheduled for December 1, 198 6, but there was no indication 
of its purpose - that is, whether it was a year-end review 
for 1985-86 or for some other purpose. 
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3. UUP forthwith, upon presentation of appropriate 
proof, remit to Barry the expenses incurred by him 
in meeting the certified or registered mail 
requirement of its agency fee refund procedure for 
appealing UUP's determination of the amount of the 
advance reduction for the 1987-88 fiscal year, with 
interest at the maximum legal rate. 
DATED: January 24, 1989 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newmar 
4,4,?—frM, «aL-
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
#2D-l/24/89 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION OF THE 
VILLAGE OF BUCHANAN, 
Charging Party, 
CASE NO. U-9259 
-and-
VILLAGE OF BUCHANAN, 
Respondent. 
SCHLACHTER AND MAURO, ESQS. (REYNOLD A. MAURO, 
ESQ., of Counsel), for Charging Party 
FERRARO, MILLER, DRANOFF, GREENBAUM, GOLDSTEIN, 
YATTO & JOHNSON, ESQS. (ARTHUR J. FERRARO, ESQ., of 
Counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
The Village of Buchanan (Village) appeals from an 
Administrative Law Judge's (ALJ) decision and order which 
found that the Village violated §209-a.l(d) of the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) by unilaterally 
assigning to a nonunit employee, the Chief of Police, road 
patrol duties which had previously been performed exclusively 
by patrolmen represented by the Police Benevolent Association 
of the Village of Buchanan (PBA). 
Decision of the Administrative Law Judge 
On the basis of the record before him, the ALJ found 
that from sometime prior to the time that Charles Cretara 
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became Acting Chief of Police of the Village in 1982,2=/ the 
Village police force had grown from a Chief and one patrolman 
to a Chief and five patrolmen. During this period of growth, 
the performance of routine patrol work by the Chief of Police 
diminished.' When Cretara was appointed in 1982, he had 
occasion to perform some patrol work during the first month. 
Thereafter, he performed none until ordered to do so in 1987. 
In the fall of 1986, the police force diminished to the 
Chief and three patrolmen. In February, 1987, the Mayor, 
without reaching agreement with the PBA, which represents a 
unit of all those performing patrol duties and does not 
include the Chief of Police, issued a memorandum ordering the 
Chief to "perform patrol duties during your scheduled 
7:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. shift, Monday through Friday 
(excluding holidays), in the absence of a regularly scheduled 
police officer". Complying with this order, Cretara has 
performed road patrol duties approximately two to four times 
a month. Prior to this order, when a regularly-scheduled 
patrolman was unavailable, another one was assigned to 
perform the patrol duties on an overtime basis. When no 
other patrolman was available, the department shut down and 
calls for assistance were channeled to the New York State 
Police. This was particularly common during the late night 
and early morning shifts. 
became the Chief of Police in 1985. 
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The ALT concluded that the road patrol duties were the 
exclusive work of the unit represented by the PBA. He 
therefore found that performance of these duties by the Chief 
pursuant to the order of the Mayor constituted a unilateral 
transfer of unit work to hohuhit"""personnel in violation "of" 
§209-a.l(d) of the Act. The ALT ordered restoration of all 
road patrol duties to the unit and that unit members be made 
whole for any lost wages resulting from the performance of 
road patrol duties by nonunit personnel. 
Exceptions of the Village 
The Village excepted to the ALT's decision and order on 
the following grounds: 
1. The Decision and Recommended Order is contrary 
to the law in that it improperly denies the 
Mayor of the Village of Buchanan the ability 
to perform his statutorily mandated duties as 
owed to the public. Furthermore, such duties 
may not be superseded by any collective 
bargaining agreement nor by an estoppel 
argument based on the alleged failure of the 
Mayor to perform such duties in the past. 
2. The Decision and Recommended Order is contrary 
to previous P.E.R.B. decisions which clearly 
indicate that unless uncontradicted proof can 
be shown that specific work is exclusive to a 
unit, then, as in the instant case, the 
assignment of unit work to other than unit 
members is not a violation. 
3. The Decision and Recommended Order finding 
that the present Police Chief Charles Cretara 
has not performed any road patrol work 
whatsoever in the past and that the in-issue 
road patrol duties are exclusive unit work, is 
unsupported by the record evidence. 
4. The Decision and Recommended Order requiring 
the Employer "to make unit members whole for 
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lost wages owing to the performance of road 
patrol duties by nonunit personnel" is 
unwarranted because if the road patrol duties 
in issue were to be assigned to the unit 
personnel, then the performance of such 
additional duties would constitute overtime 
work and the complaining unit members have an 
[sic] inherent right nor collective bargaining 
right to overtime work unless authorized or 
approved. 
The essence of the Village's first exception and the 
argument in its brief in support of that exception is that 
the Mayor has a nondelegable, statutory duty to enforce the 
laws and run the police department. It asserts that this 
nondelegable duty authorizes the Mayor to unilaterally assign 
road patrol to nonunit employees, even if it has been unit 
work. In support of this claim, it relies upon Village Law 
§4-400.1(b) and (e), which provide: 
1. It shall be the responsibility of the 
mayor: 
* * * 
b. to provide for the enforcement of all 
laws, local laws, rules and regulations and to 
cause all violations thereof to be prosecuted; 
* * * 
e. to exercise supervision over the conduct 
of the police and other subordinate officers 
of the village; 
It is our view that the Mayor's responsibilities with respect 
to the police department do not authorize him unilaterally to 
transfer unit work, such as road patrol, to nonunit 
employees. There are very few instances in which a 
governmental duty may not be delegated. They are the limited 
*) 
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ones in which the delegation would violate public policy. 
One of the rare examples is the duty of a board of education 
to make tenure decisions. Board of Education v. Aremanr 
41 N.Y.2d 527, 10 PERB H7512 (1977); Cohoes City School 
District v. Cohoes Teachers Association,40 N7Y.Td 774, 
9 PERB H7529 (1976) . It is obvious that the statutory law 
enforcement duties of the Mayor relied upon in the Village's 
brief do not preclude the assignment of some of those duties 
to subordinate officials. 
The second and third exceptions of the Village will be 
dealt with together. The Village claims that it demonstrated 
in the hearing before the ALJ that road patrol was not 
\ exclusively unit work, which we have held is a prerequisite 
to the finding of a violation. Niagara Frontier 
Transportation Authority, 18 PERB f3083 (1985). The Village 
asserts that the record shows that the Chief performed road 
patrol duties prior to the Mayor's directive. It also claims 
that the record shows that the State Police performed road 
patrol duties and has also performed emergency services when 
the Village department was shut down. With respect to the 
so-called road patrol duties by the Chief, we agree with the 
ALJ that the fact that he was seen on occasion, as testified 
to by several of the Village's witnesses, driving a police 
car within the Village, is not evidence that the Chief was 
performing road patrol. In this context, we note that in the 
' performance of administrative and supervisory duties, a 
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police chief can be expected to be seen driving through the 
jurisdiction supervised by him. This is far different from 
performing assigned patrol duties. We therefore affirm the 
ALJ's finding that the Chief has not done this work in years 
--and---tha-t--%h-e----wo^k---is--ll-un-tfer,I----wo-rk--.--- -
The fact that the State Police has performed patrol and 
other police services in the Village, over which it has 
concurrent jurisdiction, is not relevant to whether the road 
patrol duties were exclusively unit work. To the extent that 
police duties in the Village are performed by the State 
Police, such police work is not the work of the Village. 
Only if the Village were to contract out and in some manner, 
directly or indirectly, pay for the work, would it be Village 
work. 
The fourth exception of the Village asserts that the 
ALJ's order to make unit members whole for any lost wages 
owing to the performance of road patrol duties by nonunit 
personnel is incapable of accomplishment. We reject this 
exception, too. The transcript of the hearing before the ALJ 
sets forth the system by which road patrol duties were 
assigned in the absence of the regularly-scheduled police 
officer. The system utilized an overtime list, with the 
person at the top of the list being asked first. This system 
can be utilized to make the unit personnel whole. 
On the basis of the foregoing, we affirm the ALJ's 
) 
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decision and find that the Village violated §209-a.l(d) of 
the Act. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the Village: 
1. Rescind the Mayor *s memorandum dated February 3, 
1987 ordering the Chief of Police to perform patrol 
duties; 
2. Cease and desist from assigning patrol duties to 
nonunit personnel; 
3. Make unit members whole for any lost wages owing to 
the performance of road patrol duties by nonunit 
personnel; 
4. Negotiate in good faith with the PBA concerning 
unit members1 terms and conditions of employment; 
and 
5. Sign and post the attached notice at all locations 
customarily used to post notices to unit members. 
DATED: January 24, 1989 
Albany, New York 
^Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, MemberX 
j 
APPENDIX 
TO ALL EMPLO 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees in the Unit represented by the Police 
Benevolent Association of the Village of Buchanan that the Village 
of Buchanan: 
1. Will rescind the Mayor's memorandum dated February 3, 
1987 ordering the Chief of Police to perform patrol duties; 
• 2. Will not assign patrol duties to nonunit personnel; 
3.. Will make unit members whole for any lost wages owing 
to the performance of road patrol duties by nonunit personnel; 
4. Will negotiate in good faith with the PBA concerning 
unit members' terms and conditions of employment. 
Village of Buchanan 
Dated By (Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
//2E-1/24/89 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
COURT OFFICERS BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION OF 
NASSAU COUNTY, INC. 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-3271 
STATE OF NEW YORK (UNIFIED COURT SYSTEM), 
Employer, 
-and-
CSEA, INC., LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Intervenor. 
In the Matter of 
SUFFOLK COUNTY COURT EMPLOYEES 
ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Petitioner, 
-and-
STATE OF NEW YORK (UNIFIED COURT SYSTEM), CASE NO. C-3 273 
Employer, 
-and-
CSEA, INC., LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Intervenor. 
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JOSEPH A. FARALDO, ESQ., for Petitioner Court Officers 
Benevolent Association of Nassau County, Inc. 
SCHLACHTER & MAURO, ESQS., for Petitioner Suffolk County 
Court Employees Association, Inc. 
HOWARD A. RUBENSTEIN, ESQ., for Employer State of 
New York (Unified Court System) 
JEROME LEFKOWITZ, ESQ., for Intervenor CSEA, Inc., 
Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the State 
of New York (Unified Court System) (State), the Court 
Officers Benevolent Association of Nassau County, Inc. (COBA) 
and the Suffolk County Court Employees Association, Inc. 
(SCCEA), to a decision of the Director of Public Employment 
Practices and Representation (Director) dismissing 
representation petitions filed by COBA and SCCEA which seek 
to reconfigure the currently existing units of nonjudicial 
employees of the State who are assigned to certain courts in 
Nassau and Suffolk Counties. In particular, COBA seeks to 
establish a single unit consisting of all currently 
represented nonjudicial titles within Nassau County, taking 
unit members from the State Judiciary Unit represented by the 
Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, 
AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA) and from certain units of employees in 
the City Court of Glen Cove and the City Court of Long Beach, 
also represented by CSEA. The SCCEA seeks the creation of a 
unit within Suffolk County consisting of all nonjudicial 
o 
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employees in the County, taking unit members from the State 
Judiciary Unit represented by CSEA employed in the Suffolk 
County Supreme Court and the Suffolk County Office of the 
Administrative Judge and Commissioner of Jurors. 
The State supports then COBA and SCCEA petitionsT, while 
both are opposed by CSEA. 
The Director found persuasive CSEA's argument that §39.7 
of the Judiciary Law-i/ precludes PERB from entertaining 
petitions which would alter the composition of pre-existing 
units of the State's nonjudicial employees without the mutual 
consent of all affected parties, and dismissed both petitions 
accordingly. 
) 
-1/section 3 9.7 of the Judiciary Law provides as follows: 
Upon the termination of the period of unchallenged 
representation of any employee organization certified or 
recognized to represent employees of the court or court 
related agencies of the unified court system, petitions 
may be filed with the public employment relations board 
to alter negotiating units in accordance with the 
standards set forth in section two hundred seven of the 
civil service law; provided, however, that such board 
shall not alter any such negotiating unit comprised 
exclusively of such employees or that part of any other 
negotiating unit comprised of such employees. The 
provisions of this subdivision shall be applicable in 
any case in which the negotiating unit is so defined on 
the effective date of this subdivision in accordance 
with the provisions of either section two hundred seven 
or section two hundred twelve of the civil service law, 
as the case may be. Nothing herein shall preclude the 
merger of negotiating units of such employees with the 
consent of the administrative board of the judicial 
conference and the recognized or certified 
representatives of the negotiating units involved. 
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We have carefully considered the exceptions and briefs 
filed in this matter, and have heard oral argument in 
connection therewith. The arguments made before this Board 
are the same as the arguments made to, considered, and 
addressed by the Director in his decision. Based upon the 
reasoning set forth in his decision, which we adopt, we 
hereby affirm per curiam the Director's finding that §39.7 of 
the Judiciary Law requires dismissal of the instant 
petitions. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the petitions be, and 
they hereby are, dismissed. 
DATED: January 24, 1989 
Albany, New York 
vHarold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Memb 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
JOSEPH WERNER and MARY VERDON, 
Charging Parties, 
-and CASE- NOS-.- -U-9-6-8-6-
& U-9682 
MIDDLE COUNTRY TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, 
NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO, 
Respondent. 
NATIONAL RIGHT TO WORK LEGAL DEFENSE FOUNDATION 
(GLENN M. TAUBMAN, ESQ., of Counsel), for 
Charging Parties 
JAMES R. SANDNER, ESQ. (J. CHRISTOPHER MEAGHER, ESQ., 
of Counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
The Middle Country Teachers Association, NYSUT, AFL-CIO / 
(MCTA) excepts, in part, to an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) 
decision which found that its agency fee refund procedure for 
the 1987-88 fiscal year violates §209-a.2(a) of the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) in several respects. 1/ 
The MCTA's exceptions are as follows: 
1. The ALJ's finding that the MCTA's 
financial information was deficient 
because of the absence of audited and 
independent statements of chargeable and 
nonchargeable expenses is in error. 
i/Except as to those matters which are the subject of 
exceptions before this Board, the ALJ's findings are not 
addressed herein. 
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(a) Financial statements allocating 
expenses to chargeable and nonchargeable 
categories need not be audited. 
(b) The ALJ's finding that caveats in 
the audited financial statements of the 
MCTA's affiliates mean that the audits 
were not conducted in regular fashion and 
----negates-their-- independence is in -error. 
2. The ALT erred in ordering full 
restitution of the charging parties * 
agency fees. 
3. The ALJ erred in ordering the mailing of 
the posting notice to all unit employees. 
These exceptions are separately addressed below. 
Exception No. 1(a) 
MCTA asserts that, notwithstanding our decision in UUP 
(Barry, Eson, Gallup), 20 PERB f3039 (1987) (appeal pending), 
in which we held, inter alia, that an advance reduction 
determination must be based upon an independent audit of 
those expenditures which are deemed refundable and those 
which are not, an independent audit of such expenditures is 
not required by the Act. In essence, MCTA seeks 
reconsideration of our prior holding in this regard. 
We have considered MCTA's arguments and find no basis 
for disturbing our prior holding. Indeed, subsequent federal 
court interpretations given to the U.S. Supreme Court 
decision in Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 
109 S. Ct. 1066, 19 PERB [^7502 (1986), upon which we placed 
great reliance in making our findings in UUP (Barry, Eson, 
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Gallup), supra, support our own interpretation of that 
decision.-2-/ Exception 1(a) is accordingly denied, and the 
ALJ decision is affirmed in this regard. 
Exception No. 1(b) 
The"AKT foxind that certain language contained in the 
audited financial statements of chargeable and nonchargeable 
expenses submitted for MCTA's affiliates, NYSUT and AFT, 
establish an absence of independence required by our decision 
in UUP (Barry, Eson, Gallup), supra, and cases cited therein. 
The statements contained in the audited financial statements 
submitted by the firm of Buchbinder, Stein, Tunick and 
Platkin, CPAs, on behalf of NYSUT and by Main Hurdman, CPAs 
for the AFT, contain virtually the same language: 
We have applied certain agreed-upon 
procedures to the schedule with respect 
to the allocation of expenses as between 
amounts chargeable and nonchargeable to 
agency fee payers for the year ended 
August 31, 1986. Our procedures included 
the following: 
(a) We reviewed the underlying 
assumptions for reasonableness. 
(b) We tested the allocations for 
mathematical accuracy. 
•S/see, in particular, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
decision in Andrews v. Education Ass'n of Cheshire, 829 F.2d 335, 
340 (1987) , where the court stated, in connection with the scope 
of the audit requirement for chargeable and nonchargeable 
expenses: "Hudson's auditing requirement is only designed to 
insure that the usual function of an auditor is fulfilled. That 
usual function is to insure that the expenditures which the union 
claims it made for certain expenses were actually made for those 
expenses." 
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Because the foregoing procedures do not 
constitute an examination made in 
accordance with generally accepted 
auditing standards, we do not express an 
opinion on any such allocations. 
However, nothing came to our attention 
that led us to believe that the 
alloc^ atioli sTioiild I>eTadjusted. Had we 
performed additional procedures, matters 
might have come to our attention that 
would have been reported to you. 
In a decision issued simultaneously herewith, UUP 
(Barry) , 22 PERB ?[3003, we hold that a question of fact is 
created by the language contained in the audited reports 
which requires further information before any determination 
can be made as to whether the reports meet the minimum 
standards set forth in Hudson, supra, and our decision in UUP 
(Barry, Eson, Gallup), supra. For the reasons set forth in 
that decision, we decline to find at this time that MCTA's 
affiliate organizations1 audit reports are inadequate as a 
matter of law, based upon the language contained in the audit 
reports, and remand the matter for further proceedings to 
determine the independence and scope of the audit reports and 
the extent to which departure from generally accepted 
auditing standards occurred and may have affected the 
charging parties' entitlement to an independent audit of 
chargeable and nonchargeable expenses. We according remand 
this aspect of the charge to the AKJ for further evidence on 
this issue. 
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Exception No. 2 
MCTA asserts that restoration of agency shop fees for 
1987-88 to the charging parties results in a "windfall 
benefit". We disagree. The numerous aspects of the MCTA's 
agency fee refund procedure 
the Act (most of which are not at issue before us) do not 
lend themselves to apportionment. We accordingly affirm the 
ALJ's remedial order, directing the refund of agency fees 
paid by the charging parties for the 1987-88 fiscal year, 
except insofar as fees for that year have been forwarded to 
MCTA's affiliates. As to those fees forwarded to MCTA's 
affiliates, a determination will be made by the ALJ 
concerning whether the audited financial statements provided 
are adequately "independent" to meet the requirements of 
Hudson, supra, and our decision in UUP (Barry, Eson, Gallup) , 
supra, and if not, those fees forwarded to MCTA's affiliates 
shall also be refunded to the charging parties. 
Exception No. 3 
Having found that the MCTA agency fee refund procedure 
violates the Act in numerous respects, the ALJ found that the 
usual requirement that a respondent post notice at work 
locations in all places normally used by it to communicate 
information with bargaining unit employees is inadequate, 
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because agency fee payers may not read notices contained on 
MCTA bulletin boards. She accordingly directed a posting of 
the notice and a direct mailing of it to all bargaining unit 
members. In UUP (Barry, Eson, Gallup), supra, we recognized 
the potential for the problem of agency fee payers not 
reading employee organization bulletin boards. We there 
addressed it by directing the posting of the required notice 
in the customary manner, and by directing the inclusion of 
the notice prominently in the next available issue of the 
employee organization's newspaper. We find that the same 
approach is appropriate here, if the MCTA issues a newspaper 
directly to all bargaining unit members. If it does not, 
MCTA is directed to both post the required notice and mail it 
to all agency fee payers identified in the payroll deduction 
list immediately preceding such mailing. 
Except as otherwise indicated herein, the decision of 
the ALT is affirmed and IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that: 
1. This matter is remanded to the ALT for a 
determination concerning the appropriateness of the 
audits conducted by the accounting firms retained 
by MCTA affiliate organizations of those 
expenditures which are deemed refundable and those 
which are not; 
2. MCTA forthwith refund to Werner and Verdon the 
amount of agency fees deducted from their salaries 
U-9680 & U-9682 
-7 
payable to MCTA and not forwarded to its 
affiliates, for the 1987-88 fiscal year, together 
with any costs incurred by them in meeting the 
certified or registered mail requirement of its 
agency fee refund procedure for the 1987-88 xrscal 
year, with interest at the maximum legal rate. 
Amend its agency fee refund procedure, for the 
1988-89 and future fiscal years, to provide at 
least a 3 0-day period to file initial objections to 
the agency fee deduction; to provide that, prior to 
the period for filing initial objections, agency 
fee payers shall be given an audited statement of 
chargeable and nonchargeable expenses for the 
latest fiscal year for which such an audit is 
available; to provide for placing the amount of 
agency fees reasonably in dispute, plus a 10% 
cushion, in an interest-bearing escrow account 
while challenges are pending or for the addition of 
a 10% cushion to the advance reduction payment; and 
to delete the requirement that objections and 
appeals be made by certified or registered mail. 
In the future, insure that the financial 
information provided to agency fee payers is 
audited and sufficiently categorized so as to 
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DATED: 
permit them to determine whether utilization of the 
refund procedure is warranted. 
Forthwith post the attached notice at all work 
locations ordinarily used by MCTA to communicate 
information with bargaining unit employeesi 
Include such notice prominently in the next 
available issue of an MCTA newspaper which is 
distributed directly to all bargaining unit 
members, or, in the alternative, mail the attached 
notice to the last known residence address of all 
agency fee payers in the MCTA unit, based upon the 
most recent payroll deduction list prior to such 
mailing. 
January 24, 1989 
Albany, New York 
/& A/Z 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member C 
APPENDIX 
NOTICE TO ALL E 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees in the unit represented by the Middle Country 
Teachers Association (Association), that the Association: 
1. Will forthwith refund to Werner and Verdon the amount of agency fees 
deducted from their salaries payable to MCTA and not forwarded to its affiliates, 
for the 1987-88 fiscal year, together with any costs incurred by them in meeting 
the certified or registered maii requirement of its agency fee refund procedure 
f~r the 1987-88 fiscal year,' with interest at the maximum legal rate, 
2„ Will amend its agency fee refund procedure, for the 1988-89 and future 
fiscal years, to provide at least a 30-day period to file initial objections 
to the agency fee deduction; to provide that, prior to the period for filing 
initial objections, agency fee payers shall be given an audited statement of 
chargeable and nonchargeable expenses for the latest fiscal year for which 
such an audit is available; to provide for placing the amount of agency fees 
reasonably in dispute, plus a 10% cushion, in an interest-bearing escrow account 
while challenges are pending or for the addition of a 10% cushion to the advance 
reduction payment; and to delete the requirement that objections and appeals be 
made by certified or registered mail0 
3. Will, in the future, insure that the financial information provided 
to agency fee payers is audited and sufficiently categorized so as to permit 
them to determine whether utilization of the refund procedure is warranted. 
MIDDLE COUNTRY TEACHERS ASSOCIATION 
Dated By.. (Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CATTARAUGUS-ALLEGANY-ERIE-WYOMING 
COUNTIES BOCES UNIT OF CATTARAUGUS 
COUNTY LOCAL 805, CSEA, INC., 
CSEA/AFSCME LOCAL 1000, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-10219 
CATTARAUGUS-ALLEGANY-ERIE-WYOMING 
COUNTIES BOCES, 
Respondent. 
MARILYN S. DYMOND, ESQ., for Charging Party 
PETER K. HULBURT, ESQ., for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the 
Cattaraugus-Allegany-Erie-Wyoming Counties BOCES Unit of 
Cattaraugus County Local 805, CSEA, Inc., CSEA/AFSCME Local 
1000, AFL-CIO (CSEA) to an interim decision of the 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) which held, pursuant to 
§2 05.5(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act 
(Act),i/ that the Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) 
lacks jurisdiction over one aspect of CSEA's charge against 
•^/section 2 05.5(d) of the Act provides, in relevant part, as 
follows: "[T]he board shall not have authority to enforce an 
agreement between an employer and an employee organization and 
shall not exercise jurisdiction over an alleged violation of such 
an agreement that would not otherwise constitute an improper 
employer or employee organization practice." 
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the Cattaraugus-Allegany-Erie-Wyoming Counties BOCES (BOCES). 
CSEA alleges in its charge that teacher aides employed 
at certain facilities of the BOCES, who are hourly employees, 
were informed by memorandum dated February 9, 1988, that they 
would hot receive pay for regularly scheduled hours hot 
worked as a result of unscheduled closings or early 
dismissals. CSEA alleges that this policy was utilized on 
March 28 and 29, 1988, when teacher aides were directed by 
BOCES not to report to work and they were not paid for those 
days. CSEA asserts that this policy, and its implementation, 
constitutes a unilateral change in terms and conditions of 
employment prohibited by §2 09-a.l(d) of the Act. 
The evidence before the assigned AKJ establishes that 
CSEA, contemporaneously with its filing of the improper 
practice charge, also filed a contract grievance alleging 
that the employer's promulgation and implementation of its 
policy concerning nonpayment to teacher aides for hours not 
worked violates several articles of the parties' collective 
bargaining agreement.-2-/ 
•2-/The contract language primarily relied upon by BOCES in 
support of its claim that the contract covers the instant 
issue and that dismissal of the charge is accordingly 
required, provides as follows: "all teacher aides covered by 
this contract shall work on a 180 (one hundred eighty) day 
year and/or periods of pupil attendance between the first day 
of school in September and June 3 0th each year with daily 
work scheduled between Monday and Friday set by BOCES 
management." 
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Based upon the fact that CSEA had filed a contract 
grievance, the ALJ determined, pursuant to §205.5(d) of the 
Act, that PERB lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the 
issue raised by CSEA's charge because the charge seeks 
nothing more than enforcement of the parties' collective 
bargaining agreement. The ALJ dismissed this aspect of the 
charge with prejudice. 
CSEA's exceptions to the ALJ decision assert that the 
ALJ erred in finding that the right to payment claim by CSEA 
derives from its collective bargaining agreement and that 
PERB lacks subject matter jurisdiction. It also asserts 
that, rather than dismissing the charge with prejudice, the 
ALJ should have conditionally dismissed the charge, deferring 
the question of PERB's subject matter jurisdiction to the 
conclusion of the contract arbitration process, pursuant to 
this Board's decision in Herkimer County BOCES, 2 0 PERB [^3 050 
(1987) . In that case we considered the question whether "the 
filing of a contract grievance automatically takes the action 
complained of outside the scope of PERB's jurisdiction", 
Herkimer County BOCES, supra, at 3109, and found that it did 
not. We there stated further that deferral of the 
determination of PERB's jurisdiction "when there is a pending 
contract grievance is a more equitable result than outright 
dismissal of the charge with prejudice." In keeping with our 
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decision in Herkimer County BOCES, we modify the ALJ's 
dismissal of the at-issue aspect of this improper practice 
charge, dismissing the charge only conditionally. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the determination of PERB's 
jurisdiction over the charge alleging a violation of CSL 
§2 09-a(l)(d) is deferred, and the charge is conditionally 
dismissed, with opportunity to the Association to file a 
timely motion to the Director at the conclusion of the 
contract grievance procedure to reopen the charge upon the 
ground that the jurisdictional limitations contained in CSL 
§205.5(d) do not apply to its charge. 
DATED: January 24, 1989 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Membar 
//2H-1/24/89 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
GREECE TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, NEA/NY, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-9787 
GREECE CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
CHRISTOPHER J. KELLY, for Charging Party 
STANTON AND VANDER BYL, ESQS. (WAYNE A. VANDER BYL, ESQ. 
of Counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
The Greece Teachers Association, NEA/NY (GTA) excepts to 
an Administrative Law Judge (AKJ) decision which dismissed 
its charge against the Greece Central School District 
(District). The charge alleges that the District violated 
§§209-a.l(d) and (e) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment 
Act (Act) when it increased from four to five the number of 
assigned teaching periods for seventh and eighth grade 
teachers. 
For the 1987-88 school year, seventh and eighth grade 
teachers were required to teach one additional academic class 
period in exchange for supervision of one study hall period. 
Five days after the charge was filed, the GTA ratified a 
collective bargaining agreement which contained the following 
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provision: "Seventh and Eighth grade teams shall teach 5 
classes effective upon ratification of this contract." 
At issue before the ALJ, then, was whether the District's 
requirement that seventh and eighth grade teachers teach a 
fifth academic period from the commencement of the academic 
year until November 11, 1987, when ratification of a 
successor contract occurred, violated the Act. 
The ALJ's dismissal of the charge was based upon a 
determination that a unilateral increase in student contact 
hours, which does not otherwise increase the teachers' 
workday or decrease their free time, does not constitute a 
violation of §209-a.l(d) of the Act, citing this Board's 
decisions in East Ramapo CSD, 17 PERB [^3001 (1984) , and 
Wvandanch UFSD, 16 PERB ^3012 (1983). 
The ALJ also dismissed so much of the GTA's charge as 
alleges that the District violated §209-a.l(e) of the Act 
when it failed to continue the terms of the parties' expired 
agreement until negotiation of a successor agreement. The 
language of the expired collective bargaining agreement 
relied upon by the GTA is as follows: 
Article XV Section 3(b)(3) - The parties 
agree that the District may reorganize 
the secondary schools and that the 
effects of any such reorganization upon 
the terms and conditions of employment 
shall be negotiated between the parties. 
Having found that the increase in the number of academic 
teaching periods for seventh and eighth grade teachers from 
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four to five is not a mandatory subject of negotiation and is 
accordingly not a "term and condition of employment" within 
the meaning of the Act, the ALT concluded that the 
contractual agreement to negotiate "terms and conditions of 
empToyment" uponreorganization of the- secondary schoToTs has 
no application to the increase in teaching periods. Because 
no evidence was presented establishing an intent by the 
parties to give a different meaning to the language of the 
contract than has been given to the statutory language, the 
ALJ dismissed that aspect of the charge also. 
The only exceptions before us are the following: 
1. The Administrative Law Judge erred in 
her determination that Troy Uniformed 
Firefighters Association, 10 PERB 53015 
(1977) and other cases cited in footnote 
15 on page 10 are dispositive of the 
status of the negotiability of 
nonmandatory subjects of negotiations. 
2. The Administrative Law Judge erred in 
her conclusion of fact that the 
unilateral assignment of an additional 
period does not constitute a violation of 
Article [sic] 209-a.l(e) because it was 
not covered by the terms of the expired 
agreement. 
The GTA alleges, in support of its exception No. 1, 
that, in essence, the District was equitably estopped from 
unilaterally implementing an increase in teacher academic 
class periods because, at the time of such implementation, it 
was engaged in negotiations concerning the subject with the 
GTA. It does not except to the ALJ's finding or contend that 
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the increase in teacher academic class periods is a mandatory 
subject of negotiation, 1/ and we accordingly do not address 
that issue here. The GTA contends that unilateral 
implementation of a nonmandatory subject of negotiation, at 
the same time that negotiations on the subj ect are taking 
place, per se constitutes bad faith bargaining. We disagree. 
In Troy Uniformed Firefighters Association, 10 PERB 
H3015 (1977), we held (at 3031): 
Parties may negotiate over non-mandatory 
subjects of negotiation and are 
encouraged to do so. However, in doing 
so they do not alter the character of a 
demand from non-mandatory to mandatory; 
neither do they obligate themselves to 
negotiate over such a matter in the 
future, [footnote omitted] 
An employer is prohibited by §209-a.l(d) of the Act only from 
unilaterally changing those matters about which it has a duty 
to bargain. If an employer does not have a duty to bargain 
over a subject because it is nonmandatory, it follows that it 
may unilaterally implement a change without running afoul of 
that section of the Act.-2-/ Here, there is no evidence 
whatsoever that the District made material misrepresentations 
of its positions or that the GTA relied to its detriment 
thereon, such that a failure to negotiate in good faith may 
i/cf. New Rochelle Housing Authority, 21 PERB <J[3054 (1988) . 
^/see, e.g. , Spencerport CSD, 12 PERB 5[3074 (1979), conf'd 
80 A.D.2d 704, 14 PERB \1001 (3d Dep't 1981), motion for 
leave to appeal denied, 53 N.Y.2d 605, 14 PERB ^7016 (1981) . 
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be inferred. The unilateral implementation of a subject 
matter not alleged to be mandatory in nature does not give 
rise to a violation of the Act simply because negotiations 
are ongoing. To find otherwise would discourage rather than 
encourage negotiation of Tionmandatory subjects of bargaining, 
a result which would be inconsistent with one of the purposes 
of the Act. Exception No. 1 is accordingly denied and the 
ALJ decision is affirmed in this regard. 
We also deny exception No. 2. The ALJ correctly found 
that, in the absence of testimony establishing an intent by 
the parties to give a different meaning to the language 
"terms and conditions of employment" contained in the 
) parties1 agreement than as the term is used in the Act, the 
language must be construed as a term of art and interpreted 
in accordance with its customary meaning in public sector 
labor relations in this State. Having found that the 
language relied upon by the GTA in its collective bargaining 
agreement has no application to the at-issue charge, the ALJ 
properly dismissed so much of the charge as alleges a 
violation of §209-a.l(e) of the Act. 
The exceptions before us having been denied in their 
entirety, the decision of the ALJ is affirmed, and 
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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the charge be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed in its entirety. 
DATED: January 24, 1989 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
#21-1/24/89 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
WESTERN REGIONAL OFF-TRACK BETTING 
UNION, LOCAL 222, SEIU, AFL-CIO, CLC, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-10157 
WESTERN REGIONAL OFF-TRACK BETTING 
CORPORATION, 
Respondent. 
CRIMI & CRIMI, ESQS. (CHARLES F. CRIMI, JR., ESQ., 
of Counsel), for Charging Party 
MOOT & SPRAGUE (JEREMIAH J. MC CARTHY, ESQ., 
of Counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of Western 
Regional Off-Track Betting Union, Local 222, SEIU, AFL-CIO, 
CLC (Local 222) to an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) decision 
which dismissed its improper practice charge against the 
Western Regional Off-Track Betting Corporation (Corporation). 
The charge alleges that the Corporation violated §209-a.l(d) 
of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it 
refused to negotiate modifications to the existing collective 
bargaining agreement between the parties upon the terms 
sought by Local 222. In particular, Local 222 alleges that, 
notwithstanding the 1974 and 1975 certifications by this 
Board of two separate bargaining units, comprised of rank-
Board - U-10157 
and-file employees and supervisory employees respectively, 
both of which were represented by Local 222, the parties had, 
in fact, merged the units by practice, creating a single unit 
covered by single collective bargaining agreements over a 
period of years. Local 222 further asserts that the 
Corporation violated its duty to negotiate in good faith when 
it refused to negotiate modifications to the existing single 
collective bargaining agreement, and notified Local 222 that 
it would only negotiate separate agreements for each unit. 
The ALJ held that, notwithstanding some history of 
treatment of the two units as one for the purposes of 
negotiations and contract administration, there is evidence 
of acknowledgment of the existence of two units also. 1/ In 
addition, Local 222 has, in other proceedings before this 
Board, and in the instant case, acknowledged the existence of 
i/The parties agreed in a 1975 letter of intent as follows: 
Unit Determination: The parties agree that the New York 
State Public Employment Relations Board has determined 
that separate units were formed as designated. The 
terms and conditions of the basic collective bargaining 
agreement, are considered to be applicable to both units 
except as otherwise provided in a separate memorandum of 
understanding executed by the parties. For the purpose 
of determining promotions, it is agreed that the avenue 
of promotions exists from senior ticket machine 
operators to assistant branch managers, without 
prejudice to the position of either party in any future 
agreement. 
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two separate units, in contradiction of its claim that only-
one unit exists in fact. 
2/ 
Based upon the language of the original agreement to 
negotiate jointly for both units and the subsequent 
acknowledgments of two separate bargaining units, the ALJ 
concluded that our holdings in County of Rensselaer, 15 PERB 
53127 (1982), do not apply to the instant charge. 
3/ 
Having found two separate bargaining units to exist, the 
ALT turned to the question of whether a demand to engage in 
coalition negotiations constitutes a mandatory subject of 
bargaining. Relying upon a number of cases decided by this 
Board in relation to negotiation of ground rules and/or 
negotiating procedures, which we have held to be 
nonmandatory,4/ the ALJ concluded that the Corporation's 
^/in August, 1987, in relation to a May 29, 1987 petition 
filed by the Corporation which sought to "reaffirm the 
existence of two separate bargaining units certified by PERB 
on October 9, 1974 and January 9, 1975 . . . ", Local 222 
executed a statement which provided as follows: "This will 
acknowledge the continued existence of the two separate 
bargaining units referred to in OTB's decertification 
petition." Subsequent correspondence confirmed Local 222's 
acknowledgement, as detailed by the ALJ in her decision at 21 
PERB f4603 (1988). 
1/ 
In that case we held that, under certain circumstances, 
two separately certified units could be deemed to have been 
merged into one by the parties' conduct. However, the ALJ 
found that the parties' conduct and statements in the instant 
case did not give rise to such a merger of units and declined 
to find as a fact the existence of a single unit. 
4/see Marcellus CSD, 21 PERB 53035 (1988) ; CSEA Local 83 2, 
15 PERB 53101 (1982); Shelter Island PBA, 12 PERB 53112 (1979). 
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refusal to engage in coalition negotiations did not violate 
§209-a.l(d) of the Act. 
Local 222*s exceptions are to these two ALJ findings. 
It asserts that the statements made acknowledging the 
existence of separate rank-and-file and supervisory units 
merely constituted an acknowledgment that this Board has not 
certified a single unit. However, the language of the 
acknowledgments in numerous writings detailed by the ALJ in 
her decision does not support Local 222's construction, and 
this exception is accordingly denied. 
Local 222 further asserts that even if two separate 
units are found to exist, the Corporation violated its duty 
to negotiate in good faith because it breached a 1975 
agreement which provided that the terms of the collective 
bargaining agreements negotiated between the parties were to 
apply to both units, except as otherwise agreed. The ALJ 
found that to the extent that Local 222 asserts a violation 
of its agreement with the Corporation, it merely seeks 
enforcement thereof, a matter over which we lack jurisdiction 
pursuant to §205.5(d) of the Act. The ALJ properly dismissed 
this aspect of the charge and her decision is affirmed. 
Local 222 finally alleges that a unilateral refusal to 
engage in coalition negotiations violates §209-a.l(d) of the 
Act. We disagree. While coalition negotiations may often be 
both an effective and efficient means of conducting 
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negotiations for units having an identity of parties, a party 
may not be compelled to negotiate the issue of whether 
coalition negotiations will take place. To find otherwise 
would unduly delay and complicate the negotiation process and 
otherwise, .inter fere with the policies of .the Act... 
5/ 
Having found that a demand to engage in coalition 
negotiations for two bargaining units is a nonmandatory 
subject of bargaining, the Corporation's unilateral refusal 
to engage in such coalition negotiations does not give rise 
to a violation of §2 09-a.l(d) of the Act. The ALT decision 
dismissing the charge is accordingly affirmed in its 
entirety. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the charge be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: January 24, 1989 
Albany, New York 
f
 Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
•S/see cases cited at footnote 3, supra. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
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INTERNATIONAL UNION, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
-and- """'"" CASE NOS'. U-9 279, 
U-9290. U-9370, 
U-9392 
MONTICELLO CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
MANNING, RAAB, DEALY & STURM, ESQS. (IRA A. 
STURM, ESQ., of Counsel), for Charging Party 
ROSENBERG & UFBERG, ESQS. (SHELDON ROSENBERG, 
ESQ., of Counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
Consolidated before us are four-i/ improper practice 
charges filed, by Local 74, Service Employees International 
Union, AFL-CIO (SEIU) which allege numerous violations of 
§209-a.l of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) 
by the Monticello Central School District (District). The 
assigned Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) conducted a hearing, 
after which she issued a decision finding several violations 
of the Act by the District and dismissing other aspects of 
the charges. These findings are the subject of the 
fifth charge, U-9224, was dismissed without 
exceptions and is therefore not here in issue. 
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' District's exceptions and SEIU's cross-exceptions, which are 
addressed together in relation to each charge. 
U-9279 
The ALJ found as a fact (to which no exception has been 
taken) that, in response _to_ a request by some bargaining jinit 
employees, the District changed the contractual holiday of 
December 31, 198 6 to January 2, 1987, without negotiation 
with SEIU and as the result of direct dealing with bargaining 
unit members. 
The District asserts that both its change of the 
contractual holiday and its direct dealing with bargaining 
unit members are specifically authorized by Article 10(d) of 
the parties' collective bargaining agreement which provides 
as follows: 
When an employee is required to work on a contract 
holiday, he will be paid straight time for all 
hours actually worked plus holiday pay if he is 
eligible, or, at the sole discretion of the 
Superintendent, a total of straight time for all 
time actually worked on the contract holiday, plus 
another day off with pay at straight time. The day 
off shall be decided by mutual agreement of the 
employee and the Superintendent or his designee, 
but in no event will it be taken later than thirty 
(30) days after the contract holiday. 
In view of the ALJ's undisputed finding that the 
District changed the contractual holiday, and did not simply 
require employees to work on a contractual holiday, the ALJ 
appropriately concluded that the discretion granted to the 
District by Article 10(d) of the agreement to deal directly 
i 
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with affected employees concerning selection of another day 
off as compensation for having worked a contractual holiday 
does not apply to the holiday change. She accordingly found 
that Article 10(d) does not constitute a defense to the claim 
o±violation of §209-a.1(a) of the^Acti We agree with the -
ALJ's findings that the District had no contractual privilege 
for its direct dealings with unit members, and that such 
direct dealing is inherently destructive of employees' §202 
rights.-2-/ The ALJ's finding of violation of §209-a.l(a) of 
the Act is accordingly affirmed. 
In its cross-exceptions, SEIU asserts that the ALJ erred 
in deferring to arbitration that portion of its charge which 
alleges a unilateral change in terms and conditions of 
employment by virtue of the District's change of a 
contractual holiday specifically established pursuant to the 
parties' collective bargaining agreement. We agree with the 
ALJ's conclusion that deferral is appropriate under the 
circumstances of this case. As found by the ALJ, holidays 
^/See Wvandanch UFSDr 15 PERB }[3069 (1982). See also 
County of Cattaraugus, 8 PERB f3062 (1975). 
3/ 
SEIU's cross-exceptions assert that deferral should not 
have been ordered in the instant case because the District 
"had never pleaded as an affirmative defense that this issue 
be deferred to arbitration, that the record is devoid of any 
evidence to suggest that [the District] was even willing to 
arbitrate, or to waive the time limitations on the filing of 
the grievance." These requirements do not apply here. 
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'i 
are covered by Article X of the expired contract,-^-/ SEIU has 
grieved the District's change in holidays, and the said 
contract provides for binding arbitration. We have long 
maintained and favored binding arbitration for the resolution 
of disputes -which are- solely contractual in nature. 5/-
Accordingly, this charge is conditionally dismissed, subject 
to our Bordansky criteria.-6-/ 
U-9290 
The allegations contained in the second charge, U-9290, 
relate to a March 9, 1987 meeting at which a pending 
grievance was to be discussed. SEIU alleged violations of 
§209-a.l(a), (c) and (d) of the Act on the grounds that 
) Assistant Superintendent of Schools Corwin's behavior at the 
meeting prevented the employees from presenting their 
grievance. 1/ The ALJ found Corwin's conduct to be violative 
of §2 09-a.l(a) and (d) of the Act in that his patterned 
behavior evidenced a refusal to meet with the employees and 
^Article 10(a) of the parties' agreement identifies dates 
for observance of holidays, including "New Year's Eve day", 
the holiday at issue here. 
^New York City Transit Authority (Bordansky) , 4 PERB 
H4504, aff'd. 4 PERB J3031 (1971); City of Buffalo, 17 PERB 
5(3090 (1984) . See also Fulton-Montgomery Community College, 
16 PERB f4560 (1983). 
^/New York City Transit Authority (Bordansky), supra. 
•2/The details of this meeting are discussed in the ALJ' s 
decision at 21 PERB f4577, at 4694 (1988), and do not require 
recitation here. 
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an unwillingness to discuss a pending grievance in good 
faith. The District excepts to the ALJ's finding that Corwin 
did not deny SEIU's version of the meeting, and asserts that 
the record evidence does not support the AKJ •s factual 
findings.- At most, however, theDistrict establishes in its 
exceptions that a conflict exists between the parties about 
what occurred at the meeting. In essence, the District asks 
us to reevaluate the credibility of Corwin's testimony 
relative to that of SEIU's witnesses. In particular, the 
District argues that Corwin's testimony reveals that he 
expressed at the meeting a "willingness to sit and listen" 
and that this aspect of his testimony should have been 
) credited by the ALJ.^/ This Board has generally accorded 
great weight to the discretion of the ALT in evaluating 
credibility because the ALJ has the opportunity to observe 
the demeanor of witnesses.9-/ We find no justification, upon 
review of this record, to disturb the ALJ's findings, which 
are supported by evidence contained in the record, together 
with appropriate credibility determinations. Assuming, 
arguendo, that Corwin did in fact verbalize his "willingness 
to sit and listen" to the employees, we would still find a 
^/corwin's testimony regarding this statement is 
uncorroborated. 
^Hempstead Housing Authority, 12 PERB ?[3 054 (1979) ; State of 
New York, 11 PERB ^3112 (1978). 
Board - U-9279, 9290, 9370, 9392 -6 
violation in that his conduct illustrated disdain and 
intolerance for the grievance process, and thereby prevented 
the employees from exercising their rights under the Act. 
U-9370 
The allegations •-••contained in- the third charge, 11-9370/ 
relate to a bus garage incident of March 31, 1987,-=^ °-/ as to 
which SEIU filed an improper practice charge alleging a 
violation of §209-a.l(a) and (d) of the Act. The "(a)" 
portion of the charge alleges that Assistant Superintendent 
Corwin *s statements and conduct which were directed toward 
SEIU representative Bennardo in the presence of other 
employees, interfered with, and were otherwise coercive of, 
) the employees' §2 02 rights. The ALJ found Corwin's words and 
actions to be violative of §209-a.l(a) of the Act in that his 
statements and conduct undermined Bennardo's status as a 
union representative. In its exceptions, the District again 
argues that the record does not support the ALJ's findings, 
in essence asserting that the parties do not agree upon the 
facts related to the incident here in question. The 
District's exceptions merely raise the issue of credibility 
and, once again, upon review of the record, we concur with 
^/The details of this incident, which are recited in the 
ALJ's decision at 21 PERB 54577, at 4694-96 (1988), relate to 
allegations of name-calling, physical contact and refusal to 
deal with SEIU's representative. 
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the ALJ's decision as to this issue. Accordingly, we affirm the 
ALJ's finding of a §209-a.l(a) violation.-3-1/ 
In its cross-exceptions, SEIU again asserts that the aspect 
of its charge relating to an alleged improper denial of access to 
employees- arid worTcsite (whichare a 
IV of the parties' agreement) in violation of §209-a.l(d) of the 
Act should not have been deferred to arbitration. Because the 
denial of access rests on the parties* existent agreement, and 
although parallel access rights may flow from the Act, for the 
following reasons conditional dismissal of the charge is 
appropriate.i2-/ The basis for this type of deferral was first 
discussed in City of Buffalo, 17 PERB ^3090 (1984) . There we 
wrote (at 3138-39): 
The situation presented herein is a novel one. 
Article XXVII, a maintenance of benefits clause, appears 
to be applicable to the changes made by the City. Such 
a clause may, with respect to a mandatory subject of 
negotiation, as is the case here, create a contractual 
right that complements the statutory right to the 
maintenance of past practices. The contractual right, 
however, does not extinguish the statutory right. PERB 
therefore has jurisdiction over this proceeding. 
We note, however, that the statutory rights 
claimed by the charging party in this proceeding 
and the contracttual right afforded by Article 
XXVII of the contract parallel each other. We 
further note that it is the public policy of this 
State to encourage public employers and employee 
ii/see supra note 7 
-^/Although the ALJ indicated that the applicable contract 
had expired, the uncontroverted evidence shows that there 
were two contracts and that while one had expired, the one 
affecting the bus garage was still operative. 
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organizations to agree upon procedures for 
resolving disputes, (citation omitted) Finally, we 
note that the collective bargaining agreement 
between charging party and respondent contains such 
procedures, including arbitration. Accordingly, we 
defer to the parties' procedures for resoliving 
disputes. We therefore dismiss the charge, subject 
to its reinstatement should the City interpose 
obj ections: to" arbitrability or should an - -
arbitration award not satisfy the standards for 
deferral which we delineated in New York City 
Transit Authority (Bordansky), 4 PERB ^3031 (1971). 
Again, in City of Saratoga Springs, 18 PERB J3009 
(1985), we wrote (at 3022): 
In Buffalo, we held that a unilateral change of 
a past practiceduring the life of an agreement 
might violate §209-a.l(d) if the contract did not 
deal with the matter explicitly, even if the 
contract covered it indirectly in a general past 
practices clause. This would be so when the charge 
was not based upon any alleged breach of contract 
) but merely relied upon the alleged unilateral 
action. Thus, our jurisdiction was not affected by 
the existence of a relevant past practices clause 
which was not relied upon in the charge but 
disclosed during the processing of the proceeding. 
Such is the case here. The facts alleged in the 
charge assert the breach of an obligation flowing 
from the Taylor Law. Local 343 did not plead a 
breach of any contractual entitlement. Although, 
as noted by the ALT, it did refer to the alleged 
breach in its post hearing brief, we do not read 
that reference as a reliance upon the contract as a 
basis for its charge herein. 
As in Buffalo, we nevertheless decline to 
entertain this specification of the charge 
U-9392 
This charge relates to the health insurance provided to 
a new bargaining unit employee, Lance Newman. The charge 
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alleges, and the ALJ found as fact, that the District 
informed Mr. Newman, by letter dated April 9, 1987, that his 
health insurance would be provided by the District and not 
SEIU. The District took this step, notwithstanding Article 
XI o f the parties 'collective bargaining agreement
 7 which 
provides for an SEIU-administered welfare plan intended to 
cover all eligible employees, including unit member Newman. 
SEIU alleged that the District's action in relation to 
Newman's health insurance plan amounted to a repudiation of 
the parties' collective bargaining agreement, and a failure 
to negotiate in good faith, in violation of §209-a.l(d) of 
the Act. Finding that the District offered no claim of 
contractual privilege to provide a different health insurance 
plan to a unit member, and that the District's explanation 
for its conduct did not give rise to a proper defense,i3-/ the 
ALJ found a violation of §2 09-a.l(d) of the Act upon the 
ground that the District repudiated its obligation under the 
agreement regarding health insurance benefits. 
In its exceptions, the District does not deny that it 
repudiated that portion of its agreement with SEIU relating 
to administration of a health insurance plan, but argues that 
i2/The District claimed that its actions in providing a 
different health insurance plan to Newman than the 
contractually negotiated plan was motivated by its concern 
that employees were not being properly covered under the 
SEIU-administered health insurance plan. 
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its actions were necessary in order to protect employees not 
being properly covered by SEIU. We agree with the ALJ's 
finding that, regardless of its motives, the District was 
bound by the terms of its collective bargaining agreement 
--•-••-with;- SEIU, and was~ not entitled to repudiate dt. - : The ^ ALJ .:.-_.: •__-_--
correctly found that the District's actions clearly 
constitute a repudiation of the collective bargaining 
agreement and that, through its unilateral provision of a 
health insurance plan to an employee whom it concedes is 
covered by the parties' contract violates its duty to 
negotiate in good faith under §209-a.l(d) of the Act. 
Based upon the foregoing, the ALJ decision is affirmed. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED^^/ that the District: 
1. Cease and desist from interfering with, restraining 
or coercing employees in the unit represented by 
SEIU in the exercise of their rights under the Act; 
2. Cease and desist from dealing directly with unit 
employees regarding terms and conditions of 
employment; 
-=^ 2-/In its cross-exceptions, SEIU seeks modification of 
the language of the order set forth in the ALT decision, to 
include directives to the District that it "not bypass" SEIU 
and that it not "physically assault" employees or engage in 
"intentionally meaningless grievance sessions with 
preconceived notions. . . . " We find the ALJ's proposed 
order to be sufficiently specific and in keeping with the 
policies of the Act. The requested modifications are 
accordingly denied. 
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Cease and desist from refusing to meet with SEIU 
representatives to discuss in good faith grievances 
and terms and conditions of employment; 
Cease and desist from repudiating Article XI of the 
collective bargaihih^ 
insurance benefits and place Lance Newman in the 
SEIU welfare plan as provided by Article XI of the 
agreement; 
Negotiate in good faith with SEIU regarding terms 
and conditions of employment; and 
Sign and post the attached notice at all locations 
customarily used to communicate with unit 
employees. 
January 24, 1989 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman,' Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member X 
APPENDIX 
NOTICE TO ALL E 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLQYIViNT REGIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify employees in the units represented by Local 74, Service 
Employees International Union, AFL-CIO, that the District: 
1. Will not interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in 
the unit represented by SEIU in the exercise of their rights under 
the Act; 
2. Will not deal directly with unit employees regarding 
terms and conditions of employment; 
3. Will not refuse to meet with SEIU representatives to 
discuss in good faith grievances and terms and conditions of 
employment; 
4. Will not repudiate Article XI of the collective bargaining 
agreement regarding health insurance benefits and place Lance 
Newman in the SEIU welfare plan as provided by Article XI of the 
agreement; 
5. Will negotiate in good faith with SEIU regarding terms 
and conditions of employment. 
MONTICELLO CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
) This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. 
#4A-l/24/89 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
LOCAL 1170, COMMUNICATION WORKERS 
OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO.C-3417 
TOWN OF CONESUS, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that Local 1170, Communication 
Workers of America, AFL-CIO has been designated and selected by a 
majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in 
the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All full-time, part-time and temporary 
employees of the Conesus Highway Department 
(laborers, truck drivers, and equipment 
operators). 
Certification - C-3417 page 2 
Excluded: Elected officials. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with Local 1170, Communication 
Workers of America, AFL-CIO. The duty to negotiate collectively 
includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other 
terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an 
agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution 
of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a 
concession. 
DATED: January 24, 1989 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Membe/ 
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-2- June 24, 1976 
3. Board Conferences 
A.- U-0659 and U-0667 - In the Matter of Board of Education, City of 
Buffalo Building Trades Council of Board of Education Employees; 
and Board of Education, City of Buffalo and District Council of 
Buffalo and Vicinity, United Brootherhood of Carpenters and 
Joiners of America, AFL-CIO. The Board deemed it advisable to 
meet with the parties in this matter, and set same down for 
July 22, 1976 at 3:00 p.m. at its Albany office. 
B. U-1697 - In the Matter of Board of Education of the City School 
District of the City of New York, Respondent, and Council of 
Supervisors and Administrators of the City of New York, Local 
r
 "- : ::; : 1
 v s AS 0 C, AFL^ -C 10, Charging Party. The Board consTderedTthe re- ^  ^^ 
quest.of the charging party for oral argument and granted same. 
Oral argument will be held on August 10, 1976 at 11:00 a.m. in 
its New York City office, 342 Madison Avenue. 
C. U-1961 - In the Matter of Board of Education of the City School 
District of the City of New York, Respondent, and Council of 
Supervisors and Administrators of the City of New York, Local 
1, SASOC, AFL-CIO, Charging Party. The Board considered the re-
quest of respondent for oral argument and granted same. Oral 
argument will be held on August 10, 1976 at noon in its New York 
City office, 342 Madison Avenue. 
4. Board Policy. The Board adopted the following Resolution regarding 
the outside practice of members of the Public Employment Relations 
Board: 
Outside activities of the Chairman who, pursuant to Civil Service •' 
Law §205, is a fulltime State employee, are covered by Administration/ 
Personnel Policy No. 13, promulgated on January 24, 1975, which is 
applicable to all full-time members of the PERB staff. (The Board of 
Public Disclosure has indicated, in a letter dated February 19, 1976, 
that PERB's Administration/Personnel Policy No. 13 is in compliance 
with Executive Order #10.) 
Outside activities of the two part-time members of PERB may include 
the practice of law and arbitration. However, such members-- of PERB 
may not represent clients in public sector labor-related matters under 
the jurisdiction of the Taylor Law and they may not accept arbitration 
assignments involving parties subject to the Taylor Law (they may accept 
arbitration assignments involving unions that are affiliated with other 
unions that represent public employees; for example, it would not be a 
violation of this policy for one of such Board members to accept a labor 
arbitration assignment involving a Local of the Teamsters or the SEIU by 
reason of the fact that both organizations have Locals that represent, or 
are seeking to represent, employees subject to the Taylor Law so long as 
the Local involved in the arbitration does not.) (#4-6/24/76) 
The next meeting of the Board will be held on July 22 and 23, 1976 at its 
Albany Office commencing at 2:30 p.m. on July 22, 1976. 
Secretary to the Board ?^V.<I» 
